

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
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Approved For Release 2005/04/06 : CIA-RDP81M00980R001200150064-3

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓		
2	DDCI		✓		
3	DD/RM				
4	DD/NFA		✓		
5	DD/CT				
6	DD/A		✓		
7	DD/O				
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	LC	✓			
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AQ/DCI				
17	G/IPS				
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25 MAY

Remarks:

To 10: As prepared DCI response.

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HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
TENNESSEE

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Executive Registry

78-5600

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE MINORITY LEADER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

recd 18 May

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OLC #78-1103/A

May 9, 1978

Honorable Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

The Central Intelligence Agency briefings we receive from time to time are of great assistance in fulfilling our Leadership responsibilities in the United States Senate. However, in many instances we are unable to most effectively utilize the information provided because it is compartmented and cannot be discussed with key staff members who must support us in our roles as Officers of the Senate.

We recognize your statutory responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods and fully support your policy to protect against the proliferation of sensitive substantive intelligence by limiting access to only those regular staff members of Senate committees with a need to know (as opposed to staff members of a Senator's personal staff). However, we do believe that key staff members serving in the Leadership offices, thereby necessarily performing duties in the foreign affairs area, should be granted access to compartmented information. Therefore, we respectfully recommend the following proposal for your consideration:

a. A maximum of seven compartmented clearances be allocated for staff members in the Leadership offices. (This would result in adding a maximum of four compartmented clearances to the three which already exist for staff liaison to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence--as a result of the ex officio membership of the Majority and Minority Leaders--and for the Staff Director of the Office of Classified National Security Information.)

Honorable Stansfield Turner
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b. Clearances would be allocated as determined by the Majority and Minority Leaders.


c. Requests for the clearances would be signed by both the Majority and Minority Leaders.

d. It would be understood that these clearances by themselves do not authorize access to operational information falling within the jurisdiction of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

e. Material provided under this arrangement would be treated under the strictest of security standards and stored in the Office of Classified National Security Information.

Your earliest consideration of the above proposal would be appreciated.

Sincerely,



Robert C. Byrd, Jr.



Howard H. Baker, Jr.